

Online Appendix

Search terms for RO responses to coup attempts in media

Search terms
<ul style="list-style-type: none">• coup• coup d'état• oust*• rebell*• take-over• overthrow/overthrew• support*• acknowledge*• concern*• condemn*• denounc*• mediat*• sanction*• aid*• embargo• suspend*• threaten*• military• <i>name of coup country in different spellings and commonly used languages</i>• <i>name of ROs in which coup country is member in different spellings and commonly used languages: e.g. ECOWAS/CEDEAO/Economic Community of West African States/Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest</i>

Data sources for triangulation of RO responses to coup attempts

<p>Data sources</p> <p>datasets (sanctions, mediation, military intervention)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Clifton, Morgan T.; Navin A. Bapat & Yoshiharu Kobayashi (2014) The Threat and Imposition of Sanctions: Updating the TIES dataset. <i>Conflict Management and Peace Science</i> 31(5): 541–558. • Kisangani, Emizet F. & Jeffrey Pickering (2008) International Military Intervention, 1989–2005 (https://www.k-state.edu/polsci/intervention/). • Portela, Clara (2012) GIGA Sanctions Dataset (https://data.gesis.org/sharing/#!/Detail/10.7802/1346). <p>Comparative secondary literature</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Arceneaux, Craig & David Pion-Berli (2007) Issues, Threats, and Institutions: Explaining OAS Responses to Democratic Dilemmas in Latin America. <i>Latin American Politics and Society</i> 49(2): 1–31. • Bamidele, Oluwaseun & Bonnie Ayodele (2018) In the Service of Democratic Governance: The African Union Normative Framework on Unconstitutional Change of Government and ECOWAS Protocol on Good Governance and Democracy in the Post-Arab Spring. <i>Journal of Asian and African Studies</i> 53(1): 132–146. • Barracca, Steven (2007) Military coups in the post-cold war era: Pakistan, Ecuador and Venezuela. <i>Third World Quarterly</i> 28(1): 137–154. • Boniface, Dexter S. (2002) Is there a Democratic Norm in the Americas -An Analysis of the Organization of American States. <i>Global Governance</i> 8: 365–381. • Chanona, Alejandro (2011) Regional security Governance in the Americas: the OAS. In: Emil J. Kirchner & Rodrigo Dominguez (eds) <i>The Security Governance of Regional Organizations</i>. Oxon: Routledge, 107–135. • Charron, Andrea (2013) Sanctions and Africa: United Nations and Regional Responses. In: Jane Boulden (ed.) <i>Responding to Conflict in Africa. The United Nations and Regional Organizations</i>. New York: Macmillan, 77–98. • Closa, Carlos & Stefano Palestini (2018) Tutelage and Regime Survival in Regional Organizations' Democracy Protection. <i>World Politics</i> 70(3): 443–476. • Engel, Ulf (2010) Unconstitutional Changes of Government - New AU Policies in Defense of Democracy. <i>Working Paper Series</i> no. 9. • Firth, Stewart (2013) Australia's policy towards coup-prone and military regimes in the Asia-Pacific: Thailand, Fiji and Burma. <i>Australian Journal of International Affairs</i> 67(3): 357–372. • Leininger, Julia (2014) <i>A Strong Norm for Democratic Governance in Africa</i>. • Levitt, Barry S. (2006) A Desultory Defense of Democracy: OAS Resolution 1080 and the Inter-American Democratic Charter. <i>Latin American Politics and Society</i> 48(3): 93–123. • McCoy, Jennifer L. (2006) International Response to Democratic Crisis in the Americas, 1990–2005. <i>Democratization</i> 13(5): 756–775. • Nathan, Laurie (2016c) <i>Trends in Mediating in Africa Coups, 2000-2015</i>. • Omorogbe, Eki Yemisi (2011) A Club of Incumbents? The African Union and Coups d'État. <i>Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law</i> 44: 123–154. • Souaré, Issaka K. (2009) <i>The African Union and the Challenge of Unconstitutional Changes of Government in Africa</i>. • Souaré, Issaka K. (2014) The African Union as a norm entrepreneur on military coups d'état in Africa (1952–2012): an empirical assessment. <i>The Journal of Modern African Studies</i> 52(01): 69–94.

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Case studies

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Summary statistics of independent variables

Function	Name	Observations	Mean	Standard deviation	Minimum	Maximum
dependent variable 1	RO response present	8080	0.030	0.171	0	1
dependent variable 2	strength of RO response	8080	0.127	0.835	0	10
independent variable	democratic mandate	8080	0.302	0.459	0	1
independent variable	RO membership	8080	0.079	0.270	0	1
independent variable	success	8080	0.470	0.499	0	1
independent variable	democracy level RO	7797	3.147	5.037	-9.6	10
independent variable	economic position	7645	-4.995	2.764	-12.508	5.586
independent variable	military position	7039	-3.536	2.448	-9.793	8.443
independent variable	democracy level state	7887	1.540	5.212	-10	9
independent variable	prior protests	8080	0.385	0.487	0	1
independent variable	military coup	8080	0.486	0.500	0	1
independent variable	major violence	8080	0.134	0.340	0	1
independent variable	trade relations	7046	-9.751	2.932	-22.639	-2.130
control variable	prior coups	8080	1.589	1.844	0	7
control variable	year	8080	2002.535	8.171	1990	2019
control variable	region	8080	1.585	1.021	1	5

Correlation table of independent variables

	RO member	democratic mandate	democracy level RO	economic position	military position	democracy level state	prior protests	military coup	success	major violence	trade relations	prior coups	year	region
RO member	1													
democratic mandate	0.070	1												
democracy level of RO	-0.130	0.272	1											
economic position	0.009	-0.108	-0.322	1										
military position	-0.048	-0.041	0.015	0.773	1									
democracy level of country	-0.040	0.034	0.027	0.061	0.010	1								
prior protests	0.002	-0.002	0.012	0.213	0.189	0.040	1							
military coup	-0.001	0.003	-0.002	-0.035	-0.009	0.177	0.160	1						
success	-0.003	0.004	0.004	0.026	0.034	0.084	0.094	0.294	1					
major violence	0.030	-0.003	0.001	0.017	0.048	-0.088	0.011	-0.159	-0.059	1				
trade relations	0.256	0.058	-0.030	0.410	0.338	-0.021	0.192	0.003	0.069	0.017	1			
prior coups	0.025	-0.001	0.001	-0.285	-0.130	0.001	-0.153	0.183	-0.010	-0.031	-0.196	1		
year	-0.029	0.102	0.068	-0.023	-0.036	0.279	0.051	0.006	0.053	-0.043	-0.068	-0.094	1	
region	-0.045	-0.013	-0.008	0.261	0.117	0.312	0.024	-0.143	0.100	-0.115	0.192	-0.248	-0.098	1

Model for EU responses to coup attempts

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
response				
democracy level of RO		-1.674 (2.501)		-3.128 (2.454)
economic position			0.151 (0.111)	
military position				0.098 (0.105)
democracy level of country	0.099** (0.038)	0.100** (0.038)	0.087* (0.036)	0.086* (0.037)
prior protests	0.081 (0.274)	0.102 (0.276)	0.100 (0.282)	0.191 (0.281)
military coup	0.279 (0.353)	0.291 (0.355)	0.368 (0.348)	0.385 (0.350)
major violence	0.241 (0.421)	0.206 (0.417)	0.081 (0.433)	0.036 (0.432)
trade relations	0.181 (0.100)	0.164 (0.098)		
prior coups	0.188* (0.076)	0.180* (0.078)	0.184* (0.076)	0.151* (0.076)
year	0.018 (0.024)	-0.007 (0.046)	0.010 (0.025)	-0.035 (0.048)
region				
Asia	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Africa	0.690 (0.481)	0.676 (0.468)	0.727 (0.540)	0.581 (0.495)
America	0.019 (0.444)	-0.001 (0.437)	0.032 (0.450)	0.077 (0.436)
Europe	8.490*** (0.598)	8.635*** (0.620)	8.477*** (0.739)	8.450*** (0.761)
Oceania	0.918 (0.947)	1.021 (0.979)	0.758 (0.914)	0.978 (0.986)
inflate success	5.346*** (0.307)	5.604*** (0.296)	5.440*** (0.307)	5.416*** (0.296)
constant	-0.239 (0.300)	-0.251 (0.299)	-0.237 (0.306)	-0.249 (0.311)
N	112	112	112	112
AIC	285.772	287.280	287.660	289.450
BIC	334.705	338.932	336.593	341.101

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Robustness check with clustered standard errors on RO level - Combined model with effects of explanatory factors on strength of responses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
response								
democracy			0.066	0.075			0.058*	0.063*
level of RO			(0.036)	(0.040)			(0.027)	(0.031)
economic					-0.152**	-0.171**		
position					(0.057)	(0.052)		
military							-0.088	-0.110*
position							(0.062)	(0.056)
democracy	0.040	0.035	0.037	0.030	0.031	0.022	0.032	0.022
level of	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.021)	(0.018)	(0.018)	(0.017)	(0.018)	(0.017)
country								
prior protests	0.127	-0.016	-0.043	-0.199	0.116	0.029	0.023	-0.081
	(0.151)	(0.213)	(0.178)	(0.168)	(0.130)	(0.164)	(0.149)	(0.173)
military		0.625**		0.541*		0.564**		0.573**
coup		(0.218)		(0.252)		(0.175)		(0.205)
success	1.560***		1.368***		1.338***		1.317***	
	(0.199)		(0.236)		(0.191)		(0.197)	
major	0.624***	0.627***	0.649***	0.676***	0.740***	0.756***	0.695***	0.728***
violence	(0.150)	(0.180)	(0.146)	(0.155)	(0.163)	(0.158)	(0.156)	(0.162)
trade	0.022	0.017	0.047	0.060				
relations	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.051)	(0.069)				
prior coups	0.039	0.034	0.035	0.025	-0.024	-0.039	0.008	-0.008
	(0.038)	(0.049)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.033)	(0.037)	(0.026)	(0.031)
year	0.016	0.016	0.012	0.011	0.016	0.017	0.011	0.012
	(0.019)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.017)	(0.019)	(0.018)	(0.019)
region								
Asia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Africa	0.433	0.642**	0.685*	0.797**	0.354	0.429	0.514	0.535
	(0.307)	(0.248)	(0.319)	(0.267)	(0.362)	(0.352)	(0.332)	(0.318)
America	0.690	0.915	0.641	0.728	0.858*	1.024*	0.690	0.787
	(0.431)	(0.498)	(0.403)	(0.482)	(0.376)	(0.402)	(0.373)	(0.416)
Europe	1.594***	2.418***	1.098*	1.521	1.783***	2.424***	1.310*	1.895**
	(0.429)	(0.533)	(0.518)	(0.801)	(0.497)	(0.503)	(0.556)	(0.656)
Oceania	0.257	0.738	0.204	0.517	-0.075	0.267	-0.062	0.229
	(0.333)	(0.512)	(0.359)	(0.432)	(0.379)	(0.443)	(0.394)	(0.460)
inflation								
RO member	2.063***	1.961***	2.232***	2.167***	2.287***	2.134***	2.330***	2.201***
	(0.315)	(0.328)	(0.215)	(0.185)	(0.261)	(0.256)	(0.218)	(0.191)
democratic	1.329***	1.269***	1.331***	1.290***	1.395***	1.316***	1.363***	1.296***
mandate	(0.319)	(0.323)	(0.386)	(0.413)	(0.380)	(0.373)	(0.389)	(0.383)
success	-0.052	0.584***	-0.034	0.599***	-0.018	0.617***	-0.004	0.612***
	(0.209)	(0.095)	(0.162)	(0.096)	(0.179)	(0.101)	(0.155)	(0.098)
constant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.759***	3.194***	2.727***	3.130***	2.762***	3.173***	2.766***	3.162***
	(0.343)	(0.262)	(0.338)	(0.309)	(0.327)	(0.262)	(0.317)	(0.277)
N	6004	6004	6004	6004	6004	6004	6004	6004
AIC	1879.872	1920.554	1871.603	1909.138	1862.375	1898.870	1868.499	1904.816
BIC	2047.377	2088.059	2045.808	2083.343	2029.880	2066.374	2042.703	2079.021

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Robustness check with only successful coups - Combined model with effects of explanatory factors on strength of responses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
response				
democracy level of RO		0.096*** (0.023)		0.085*** (0.021)
economic position			-0.196*** (0.035)	
military position				-0.104 (0.047)
democracy level of country	0.047 (0.025)	0.051 (0.027)	0.039 (0.023)	0.041 (0.025)
prior protests	0.219 (0.295)	-0.107 (0.247)	0.216 (0.212)	-0.002 (0.236)
military coup	0.278 (0.288)	0.248 (0.270)	0.216 (0.258)	0.243 (0.257)
major violence	0.337 (0.370)	0.320 (0.328)	0.322 (0.326)	0.380 (0.315)
trade relations	-0.043 (0.065)	0.039 (0.056)		
prior coups	0.029 (0.073)	0.036 (0.074)	-0.004 (0.064)	0.021 (0.069)
year	-0.001 (0.014)	-0.009 (0.013)	0.003 (0.011)	-0.005 (0.012)
region				
Asia	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
Africa	1.012** (0.377)	1.303** (0.344)	0.777* (0.320)	0.940** (0.347)
America	1.151** (0.407)	0.827* (0.395)	1.093** (0.386)	0.766 (0.406)
Europe	2.036*** (0.432)	1.090** (0.419)	2.104*** (0.359)	1.353*** (0.406)
Oceania	1.018 (0.848)	0.730 (0.608)	0.442 (0.623)	0.394 (0.631)
inflate RO member	2.245*** (0.214)	2.499*** (0.186)	2.434*** (0.172)	2.542*** (0.179)
democratic mandate	1.369*** (0.138)	1.382*** (0.138)	1.439*** (0.146)	1.402*** (0.144)
constant	-2.785*** (0.152)	-2.692*** (0.180)	-2.731*** (0.168)	-2.714*** (0.172)
N	2964	2964	2964	2964
AIC	1295.447	1282.006	1274.636	1278.631
BIC	1427.321	1419.875	1406.510	1416.500

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001

Robustness check with only active ROs - Combined model with effects of explanatory factors on strength of responses

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
response								
democracy			0.083***	0.088***			0.073***	0.073***
level of RO			(0.022)	(0.020)			(0.020)	(0.020)
economic					-	-		
position					0.145***	0.161***		
					(0.030)	(0.031)		
military							-0.078*	-0.092**
position							(0.033)	(0.033)
democracy	0.041*	0.036	0.036*	0.028	0.031	0.022	0.029	0.019
level of	(0.017)	(0.020)	(0.017)	(0.021)	(0.016)	(0.019)	(0.016)	(0.020)
country								
prior protests	0.075	-0.076	-0.128	-0.240	0.087	0.008	-0.039	-0.116
	(0.201)	(0.205)	(0.167)	(0.167)	(0.151)	(0.168)	(0.157)	(0.170)
military		0.596**		0.497*		0.554**		0.541**
coups		(0.222)		(0.199)		(0.191)		(0.189)
success	1.504***		1.228***		1.329***		1.232***	
	(0.242)		(0.203)		(0.168)		(0.169)	
major	0.654***	0.662***	0.651***	0.692***	0.754***	0.770***	0.689***	0.737***
violence	(0.186)	(0.243)	(0.158)	(0.201)	(0.179)	(0.215)	(0.164)	(0.205)
trade	0.027	0.029	0.059	0.078*				
relations	(0.039)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.036)				
prior coups	0.032	0.028	0.028	0.020	-0.028	-0.042	-0.001	-0.017
	(0.048)	(0.061)	(0.046)	(0.055)	(0.043)	(0.055)	(0.042)	(0.053)
year	0.022*	0.024*	0.016	0.017	0.022*	0.024*	0.016	0.018
	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.011)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)	(0.010)	(0.011)
region								
Asia	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)	(.)
Africa	0.342	0.513	0.611	0.699*	0.219	0.311	0.416	0.440
	(0.321)	(0.265)	(0.321)	(0.288)	(0.286)	(0.251)	(0.302)	(0.288)
America	0.718	0.941**	0.655*	0.752*	0.894**	1.070***	0.730*	0.849**
	(0.397)	(0.334)	(0.322)	(0.297)	(0.331)	(0.291)	(0.304)	(0.292)
Europe	1.551***	2.286***	0.808*	1.311***	1.690***	2.372***	1.068***	1.716***
	(0.368)	(0.466)	(0.335)	(0.379)	(0.321)	(0.348)	(0.317)	(0.379)
Oceania	0.154	0.587	0.107	0.439	-0.146	0.223	-0.117	0.194
	(0.709)	(0.714)	(0.549)	(0.518)	(0.575)	(0.544)	(0.557)	(0.545)
inflation								
RO member	2.088***	1.974***	2.450***	2.250***	2.329***	2.093***	2.542***	2.255***
	(0.196)	(0.191)	(0.231)	(0.175)	(0.171)	(0.152)	(0.210)	(0.171)
democratic	1.057***	1.031***	0.982***	0.959***	1.108***	1.050***	1.019***	0.985***
mandate	(0.117)	(0.133)	(0.140)	(0.133)	(0.135)	(0.124)	(0.148)	(0.129)
success	-0.092	0.635***	-0.030	0.659***	-0.054	0.671***	-0.012	0.668***
	(0.143)	(0.143)	(0.166)	(0.153)	(0.153)	(0.152)	(0.153)	(0.153)
constant	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
	2.305***	2.818***	2.198***	2.658***	2.296***	2.796***	2.251***	2.792***
	(0.173)	(0.183)	(0.205)	(0.202)	(0.189)	(0.186)	(0.203)	(0.195)
N	3056	3056	3056	3056	3056	3056	3056	3056
AIC	1789.111	1831.155	1773.765	1813.093	1771.601	1811.496	1772.705	1813.047
BIC	1933.708	1975.751	1924.387	1963.715	1916.198	1956.093	1923.327	1963.669

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Measure-specific models

	Model 1 rhetorical measures	Model 2 diplomatic measures	Model 3 economic measures	Model 4 military measures
response				
democracy level RO	0.085*** (0.015)	0.028 (0.027)	0.164*** (0.035)	-0.099 (0.083)
democracy level state	0.017 (0.011)	0.035* (0.016)	0.019 (0.019)	0.111** (0.036)
prior protests	-0.305** (0.104)	-0.180 (0.158)	0.162 (0.178)	0.707 (0.361)
military coup	0.189+ (0.113)	0.270 (0.190)	0.113 (0.212)	0.000 (.)
major violence	0.481*** (0.118)	0.156 (0.276)	0.306 (0.213)	1.233** (0.465)
success	0.447*** (0.118)	1.133*** (0.181)	0.000 (.)	0.000 (.)
trade relations	0.040* (0.020)	0.002 (0.028)	0.015 (0.026)	-0.014 (0.055)
prior coups	0.008 (0.032)	-0.087* (0.041)	0.055 (0.049)	0.096 (0.082)
year	0.013 (0.007)	0.010 (0.010)	-0.008 (0.011)	0.017 (0.023)
inflate				
RO member	1.884*** (0.123)	2.305*** (0.239)	1.777*** (0.199)	0.000 (.)
democratic mandate	0.933*** (0.068)	1.420*** (0.221)	1.305*** (0.176)	1.434* (0.632)
constant	-28.949* (13.114)	-24.458 (20.171)	11.791 (22.901)	-37.618 (45.929)
N	6004	6004	2964	194
pseudo R-sq	0.395	0.544	0.359	0.281
AIC	1001.914	391.780	336.519	56.480
BIC	1082.317	472.182	402.457	85.891

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Region-specific models: Africa

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
response								
democracy level RO			0.067** (0.022)	0.075** (0.025)			0.058** (0.019)	0.065** (0.021)
economic position					- 0.134*** (0.038)	- 0.157*** (0.046)		
military position							-0.079 (0.047)	-0.106* (0.054)
democracy level state	0.038* (0.018)	0.041 (0.032)	0.040* (0.019)	0.040 (0.024)	0.027 (0.017)	0.029 (0.022)	0.031 (0.017)	0.031 (0.024)
prior protests	0.058 (0.215)	0.309 (0.584)	-0.068 (0.205)	0.035 (0.223)	0.091 (0.175)	0.241 (0.201)	0.005 (0.191)	0.129 (0.209)
military coup		0.749* (0.331)		0.623* (0.291)		0.573* (0.252)		0.605* (0.252)
major violence	0.598** (0.186)	0.637 (0.440)	0.592*** (0.162)	0.691** (0.216)	0.650*** (0.180)	0.731*** (0.221)	0.624*** (0.169)	0.733*** (0.210)
success	1.513*** (0.248)		1.334*** (0.236)		1.340*** (0.195)		1.291*** (0.205)	
trade relations	0.020 (0.039)	0.010 (0.069)	0.046 (0.041)	0.048 (0.051)				
prior coups	0.001 (0.051)	-0.023 (0.111)	-0.004 (0.050)	-0.036 (0.064)	-0.053 (0.046)	-0.091 (0.061)	-0.028 (0.046)	-0.063 (0.060)
year	0.027 (0.014)	0.017 (0.042)	0.020 (0.015)	0.016 (0.017)	0.025* (0.012)	0.019 (0.015)	0.020 (0.013)	0.015 (0.016)
inflation								
RO member	2.438*** (0.261)	2.033*** (0.545)	2.720*** (0.287)	2.382*** (0.230)	2.725*** (0.249)	2.333*** (0.178)	2.822*** (0.274)	2.434*** (0.210)
democratic mandate	1.455*** (0.195)	1.211*** (0.297)	1.498*** (0.227)	1.304*** (0.165)	1.563*** (0.222)	1.340*** (0.147)	1.543*** (0.232)	1.329*** (0.157)
success	-0.020 (0.164)	0.699*** (0.169)	0.049 (0.168)	0.710*** (0.181)	0.039 (0.172)	0.735*** (0.186)	0.071 (0.167)	0.720*** (0.187)
constant	- 2.923*** (0.229)	- 3.391*** (0.199)	- 3.012*** (0.281)	- 3.385*** (0.222)	- 3.040*** (0.278)	- 3.427*** (0.225)	- 3.071*** (0.291)	- 3.414*** (0.226)
N	4005	4005	4005	4005	4005	4005	4005	4005
AIC	1278.163	1309.069	1271.637	1302.574	1267.849	1298.782	1270.315	1300.008
BIC	1410.364	1441.270	1410.133	1441.070	1400.050	1430.983	1408.812	1438.504

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Region-specific models: Latin America

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
response								
democracy level RO			0.273** (0.093)	0.199* (0.092)			0.252** (0.079)	0.184* (0.071)
economic position					-0.292** (0.100)	-0.260** (0.082)		
military position							-0.116 (0.118)	-0.128 (0.092)
democracy level state	0.197* (0.078)	0.183*** (0.049)	0.271*** (0.055)	0.229*** (0.049)	0.272*** (0.055)	0.232*** (0.055)	0.269*** (0.056)	0.217*** (0.055)
prior protests	0.423 (0.568)	-0.842* (0.353)	-0.295 (0.545)	-1.096* (0.528)	0.331 (0.654)	-0.552 (0.678)	-0.023 (0.611)	-0.991 (0.785)
military coup		0.521 (0.377)		0.279 (0.746)		0.261 (0.711)		0.498 (0.780)
major violence	1.421* (0.719)	0.458 (0.640)	1.092 (0.581)	0.679 (0.672)	0.817 (0.960)	0.753 (0.911)	1.202 (0.807)	1.144 (0.849)
success	1.550** (0.553)		1.569** (0.500)		1.428** (0.530)		1.684** (0.537)	
trade relations	-0.054 (0.218)	0.189 (0.125)	0.185 (0.123)	0.216 (0.152)				
prior coups	0.305 (0.175)	0.354** (0.112)	0.433*** (0.128)	0.426* (0.180)	0.299* (0.133)	0.305* (0.150)	0.347* (0.152)	0.322* (0.157)
year	0.024 (0.030)	0.013 (0.020)	-0.003 (0.019)	0.004 (0.023)	0.031 (0.037)	0.034 (0.027)	0.006 (0.031)	0.016 (0.023)
inflate RO member	1.704*** (0.220)	1.580*** (0.357)	1.462*** (0.264)	1.413*** (0.370)	1.766*** (0.236)	1.784*** (0.215)	1.626*** (0.197)	1.711*** (0.225)
democratic mandate	1.186*** (0.158)	1.325*** (0.154)	1.186*** (0.166)	1.242*** (0.153)	1.227*** (0.174)	1.249*** (0.176)	1.174*** (0.164)	1.226*** (0.182)
success	0.163 (0.309)	0.280 (0.290)	-0.009 (0.315)	0.342 (0.296)	0.079 (0.258)	0.364 (0.243)	-0.027 (0.305)	0.364 (0.262)
constant	- 2.646*** (0.317)	- 2.422*** (0.409)	- 2.208*** (0.335)	- 2.353*** (0.346)	- 2.503*** (0.273)	- 2.654*** (0.272)	- 2.270*** (0.327)	- 2.492*** (0.320)
N	758	758	758	758	758	758	758	758
AIC	309.002	311.323	297.183	302.593	298.444	303.413	298.298	302.602
BIC	378.462	380.783	371.274	376.684	367.904	372.873	372.389	372.062

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Region-specific models: Asia/Oceania

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6	Model 7	Model 8
response								
democracy level RO			-0.011 (0.098)	0.102 (0.053)			0.017 (0.096)	0.087* (0.040)
economic position					-0.283* (0.128)	- 0.294*** (0.084)		
military position							-0.138 (0.116)	-0.028 (0.072)
democracy level state	-0.028 (0.039)	0.008 (0.047)	-0.023 (0.038)	-0.041 (0.080)	-0.014 (0.048)	-0.024 (0.050)	-0.026 (0.034)	-0.035 (0.068)
prior protests	-0.317 (0.585)	-0.838 (0.983)	-0.273 (0.720)	-0.901 (0.693)	-0.152 (0.575)	-0.165 (0.555)	-0.249 (0.589)	-0.650 (0.636)
military coup		0.975 (0.908)		0.726 (0.624)		1.327* (0.584)		0.769 (0.566)
major violence	1.498 (0.852)	1.452** (0.561)	1.511 (0.822)	1.172* (0.552)	2.111** (0.724)	2.285*** (0.573)	1.706 (1.001)	1.284* (0.531)
success	3.380*** (0.721)		3.434*** (0.876)		2.684*** (0.635)		3.249** (1.022)	
trade relations	-0.114 (0.085)	-0.036 (0.081)	-0.122 (0.093)	0.047 (0.073)				
prior coups	0.403* (0.199)	0.075 (0.367)	0.417 (0.228)	0.005 (0.246)	0.410* (0.171)	0.130 (0.227)	0.362 (0.186)	0.064 (0.215)
year	0.018 (0.045)	-0.001 (0.043)	0.018 (0.045)	0.008 (0.037)	0.019 (0.036)	-0.007 (0.034)	0.010 (0.045)	0.001 (0.037)
inflate RO member	1.473*** (0.367)	1.915*** (0.461)	1.471*** (0.362)	2.219*** (0.565)	1.385*** (0.387)	1.942*** (0.482)	1.413*** (0.363)	2.280** * (0.536)
democratic mandate	1.444*** (0.420)	1.525*** (0.399)	1.447*** (0.413)	1.472*** (0.393)	1.472** (0.461)	1.544*** (0.403)	1.439*** (0.419)	1.485** * (0.394)
success	- 0.969*** (0.286)	0.312 (0.283)	-0.940* (0.467)	0.435 (0.272)	- 1.291*** (0.357)	0.410 (0.302)	-1.031* (0.435)	0.463 (0.311)
constant	- 2.208*** (0.267)	- 3.028*** (0.459)	- 2.246*** (0.505)	- 2.878*** (0.467)	- 1.694*** (0.393)	- 2.742*** (0.417)	- 2.103*** (0.561)	- 2.861** * (0.458)
N	1203	1203	1203	1203	1203	1203	1203	1203
AIC	234.714	245.618	236.689	243.538	230.779	235.368	236.722	243.695
BIC	316.195	327.099	323.262	330.112	312.260	316.850	323.296	330.269

Clustered standard errors in parantheses, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001